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Abstract 
 
We combine the date-of-observation found in Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas and a 
newly-constructed dataset on the date-of-colonization at the ethnic-group level to 
study the effects of the duration of colonial rule on a variety of political, economic, 
and social characteristics of ethnic groups in Africa. We find that the duration of 
colonial rule is correlated with a dramatic shift in gender roles in Africa by 
increasing the relative status of men in lineage and inheritance systems but also 
reducing polygyny as a marriage system. A causal role for the duration of colonial 
rule is confirmed by a difference-in-difference analysis that uses never-colonized 
ethnic groups as a control group and by an analysis of changes in kinship 
terminology that tests for within-group changes in descent and inheritance rules. 
We are able to rule out missionary influence and Islam as mechanisms for these 
effects.  1  
In so far as colonial rule was brought home to the ordinary African villager, it was usually 
through the agency of the district commissioner...  a “white chief” exercising his rule directly or 
indirectly according to the rules of the colonial power which he served. 
 Michael Crowder, “The White Chief of Tropical Africa,” 1978, p. 125. 
The Commissioner went away… In the many years in which he had toiled to bring civilization to 
different parts of Africa he had learned a number of things…. As he walked back to the court he 
thought about that book… He had already chosen the title… The Pacification of the Primitive 
Tribes of the Lower Niger. 
Chinua Achebe, Things Fall Apart (1959) pp. 208-09. 
 
 
1   INTRODUCTION  
George Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas (1967) is a rich compendium of European ethnographic 
observations on African societies. There is a tendency in the contemporary history and 
development literatures to use the Ethnographic Atlas as a snapshot of pre-colonial Africa: a 
description of the state of the continent as it existed on the eve of colonial rule.1 We feel that this 
tendency is both problematic and a sub-optimal use of the rich ethnographic detail contained in 
the Ethnographic Atlas. First, the data in the Ethnographic Atlas is not a snapshot of Africa. 
Each of the 530 observations on Africa has a date stamp that records the approximate date-of-
observation. According to Murdock, the “approximate time level to which the ethnographic data 
pertains” ranges from 1830 to 1960 (Murdock 1967, p. 116). It is neither a panel nor a cross-
section, but the tendency has been to ignore the temporal heterogeneity despite the very real 
possibility that groups observed in 1830 may systematically differ from groups observed in 1960, 
and for reasons having to do with the passage of time.  
Second, current research tends to focus on the static boundaries of African chiefdoms and how 
African elite political hierarchies from the past continue to shape economic development in 
1 This tendency is notable in recent work on the relationship between pre-colonial institutions and contemporary 
economic development (Michalopolous and Papaioannou 2013; Michalopolous and Papaioannou 2011; Englebert 
2000; Gennaioli and Rainer 2007); the relationship between factor endowments and institutional development 
(Fenske 2013); the relationship between “traditional” plough use and gender norms today (Alesina, Giuliano and 
Nunn 2013); the effects of the trans-Atlantic slave trade on ethnic institutions (Whatley 2011, 2014) and current 
levels of trust (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011); and work on the determinants of pre-colonial political centralization 
(Osafo-Kwaako, and Robinson. 2013; Obikili, Nonso. 2013). 2  
                                                        
Africa today.2 The Ethnographic Atlas, however, contains an abundance of other richly-nuanced 
ethnographic detail on the beliefs, practices and institutions that shaped the everyday lives of the 
people governed by these elites – like family structure, kin relations, gender relations, inheritance 
patterns and the like – all of which feature prominently in the economic ascendancy of the West. 
We might want to see how the regions differed in this regard. 
 
Finally, the Ethnographic Atlas contains information that spans 130 years of African history. 
Perhaps researchers tend to view the Atlas as a snapshot of Africa because Africa is thought to be 
“traditional” and slow to change, or maybe even void of history before European conquest. 
Perhaps it is because many of the ethnographies were written by European missionaries, district 
commissioners and anthropologists who held biased, ethnocentric and racist views of the 
Africans they studied, like the district commissioner in Achebe’s Things Fall Apart (1959). Or 
perhaps quantitative researchers mistrust ethnographic information, especially ethnographic 
information that has been coded for quantitative analysis.  
 
We do not believe that any of these potential biases should preclude the investigation of the 
historical information contained in the Atlas. The time stamp is a feature of these data just like 
spatial boundaries and political centralization, and it offers a unique opportunity to study 
historical changes in Africa during a crucial episode in its history – the period of European 
colonial rule. The time stamp, for example, can be used to estimate the duration of colonial rule 
experienced by each society prior to being observed by ethnographers. Estimating and assigning 
a different duration of colonial rule to each society in the Ethnographic Atlas creates the 
opportunity to study the process of pacification of African societies by paramount “white chiefs,” 
as distinct from African chiefs, which has been the general tendency thus far.3 
 
In this paper we exploit the temporal heterogeneity in the Ethnographic Atlas to document some 
of the ways that African societies were changed by the duration of time that white chiefs held 
paramount authority over them. To do this, we construct a measure of colonial occupation as the 
duration of time between the date-of-colonization of an ethnic group’s territory and the date-of-
observation as recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas. We take great care to estimate sub-national 
2 Michalopolous and Papaioannou (2011, 2013), Englebert (2000); Gennaioli and Rainer (2007); Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson (2013). 3 See footnote 2. 3  
                                                        
dates of colonization and to control for possible endogeniety in both the date-of-colonization and 
the date-of-observation. We then look to see if the estimated duration of colonial rule can explain 
any of the variation in the structures and institutions of the societies recorded in the 
Ethnographic Atlas. We control for a long list of geographic feature that might be correlated with 
societal characteristic. We include a number of variables designed to randomize the date-of-
colonization and the date-of-observation. We control for the influences of broad changes over 
time in colonial policies, globalization, world wars and other macro events and trends. What 
remains is an estimate of the marginal effects on African societies of time spent as colonial 
subjects of European colonial powers. We call this pacification. 
 
We find that, conditional on this very rich set of geographic controls and using within-colony 
and within-decade variation in the duration of colonial rule, colonial pacification dramatically 
changed gender roles in Africa. Pacification reduced polygyny, reduced matriliny in descent 
rules and inheritance rights and increased patriliny in descent rules and inheritance rights. These 
are fundamental changes in the principles of organization of pre-state societies, and we are 
encouraged by the fact that our statistically significant findings are primarily on family structure, 
lineage and descent variables -- precisely the kinds of scientific observations that anthropologists 
were trained to make. 
 
Were these effects causal? Did pacification cause these changes in gender roles, or was the 
timing of colonization and the timing of observation coincident with changes that were already 
taking place? Would these changes have taken place in the absence of colonization by 
Europeans? We acknowledge the difficulty in answering this question definitively, but we 
present further evidence that these changes were in fact caused by the duration of pacification. 
We show that the results are largely robust to using a differences-in-differences analysis that uses 
never-colonized groups as a control group. Furthermore, the cross-sectional results are validated 
by a unique estimation technique that uses information encoded in linguistic kinship terms as a 
proxy for within-group historical change in descent rules and inheritance rights.  Finally, we are 
able to rule out missionary influence as a mechanism for these effects.  
 
Section 2 of the paper describes the Ethnographic Atlas and its coverage.  Section 3 discusses the 
data and the controls variables that we use to identify and estimate pacification effects. This 4  
section highlights the construction of a new variable that measures the date-of-colonization at the 
ethnic-group level. Section 4 presents empirical results on time trends and the duration of 
pacification. In section 5 we conduct two additional tests of causation, and in section 6 we 
examine potential mechanisms. We conclude, in section 7, by discussing the significance of the 
results for the study of Africa in the colonial era and beyond. 
2   THE ETHNOGRAPHIC ATLAS 
The Ethnographic Atlas was initially published by George P. Murdock in the journal Ethnology 
in 29 installments between January, 1962 and July, 1980. His intention was to be comprehensive: 
“The editors of this journal feel that ethnological science has long stood in need of some 
coordinated means by which the vast accumulation of ethnographic knowledge can be... 
classified (Murdock 1962, p. 113).” The first issue introduced variables relating to the social 
organization of 100 societies “representing a fairly even distribution throughout the world 
Murdock 1962, p. 113).” Each subsequent issue added both variables and groups, culminating in 
a summary volume in 1967 that listed over 60 variables for 862 societies, with variables ranging 
from “Marital Residence” to “Jurisdictional Hierarchy” to “Ground Plan of Dwelling.” Later 
issues increased the number of societies to 1267. The complete Ethnographic Atlas was digitized 
and published in 1999 by J. Patrick Gray. 
  
The Ethnographic Atlas covers all continents except Antarctica, but by Murdock’s own 
admission it is more complete for some areas than others. Murdock surveyed “practically the 
entire ethnographic literature (1967, p. 109)” for Africa, North America, and South America, and 
claimed “comparable completeness (p. 109)” for North Africa as well. Murdock admitted that his 
coverage of Europe was especially weak but claimed confidence in his coverage of Africa: “the 
author has reason to believe that a completely exhaustive survey of the literature would reveal... 
in Africa a few new societies but probably no additional clusters (p. 115).” Murdock used both 
primary sources (ethnographic and anthropological studies based on direct fieldwork) and 
secondary sources which were themselves based on “the archives of missionary societies, as well 
as field notes and special communications by anthropologists and others (Forde 1954, p. v).” 4 
  
4 We count 1,453 consulted references listed in the selected bibliographies in George Murdock, Africa: Its 
People and their Culture History (1959). 5  
                                                        
Murdock intended the Ethnographic Atlas to be the basis for the statistical analysis of 
ethnographic studies. Specifically, he envisaged researchers drawing random samples from each 
of 412 world clusters to perform cross-cultural studies documenting statistical regularities and 
testing theories of social structure and change.5 Murdock was always engaged in debates about 
the causes of social change,6 but economists studying Africa have tended to use his data more as 
a turn-of-the-century census of Africa.  
 
Interpreted as a cross-section, the African data in the Ethnographic Atlas are revealing (see 
Appendix 1 for a full description of the data and Appendix 2 for a description of the variables 
used in this study). On the date of observation, most societies in the Ethnographic Atlas relied 
very little on gathering, hunting, or fishing, instead using animal husbandry and agriculture as 
sources of subsistence. On average, groups relied on animal husbandry for about 30% of their 
food needs and agriculture for 60%. The average group practiced extensive or shifting 
agriculture and the mean size of local communities was approximately 400 people. Most groups 
were organized into petty chiefdoms rather than large states, notable exceptions being the Bubi, 
Kafa, Moroccans, and Tunisians. Within local communities there were generally three levels of 
jurisdictional hierarchy: nuclear family, extended family, and clan-barrio. Class stratifications 
existed and were fairly well-developed, with discernible wealth distinctions for the average 
group, although this is subject to wide variation. Polygyny was far more prevalent than 
monogamy. Slavery was present in approximately 37% of the groups at the time of observation, 
but had been formerly present and subsequently abolished in 56% of our sample. Succession to 
local political office was determined primarily by an “absolutist” (67%) selection process rather 
than a “liberal” (2%) or “democratic” (9%) one. Primogeniture in both land and property 
inheritance was more prevalent than equality of inheritance distribution, although not by a wide 
margin. Approximately 65% of the groups disbursed inheritable goods along patrilineal lines, 
and 15% along matrilineal lines. The median group was observed in 1920 with 27 years of 
colonial occupation. When restricted to groups observed after the onset of colonial rule, the 
average is 30 years.  
 
5 The Cross-Cultural Survey project was initiated in 1937. Murdock used the first 150 societies to test theories of social structure and change in the book Social Structure (1949). 6 See Murdock, Social Structure (1949), chapter 8 entitled “Evolution of Social Organization.” Also note the title of his book on Africa cited in the footnote above. 6  
                                                        
In order to determine the approximate locations of the societies recorded in the Ethnographic 
Atlas, we follow convention and link the Ethnographic Atlas to the “Murdock Map,” a 1959 map 
drawn by George Murdock that depicts the geographic boundaries of traditional ethnic 
homelands (Murdock 1959). Of the approximately 830 groups represented by the Murdock Map, 
our dataset contains observations for 441. If an ethnic group straddles what is now a country border it is divided into two group-country observations. If it straddles three borders then it is divided into three group-country observations, etc. The resulting group-country dataset 
contains approximately 680 group-country observations across 48 modern-day countries. This allows the analysis to control for colonial and colonizer-specific effects on group characteristics. Some variables in the EA are more complete than others, ranging from no 
missing observations to almost 2/3 missing. We restrict our analysis to the more-complete 
variables of economic and social significance. Figure 1 displays the Murdock Map of ethnicities 
and the locations of the 684 group-country observations found in the Ethnographic Atlas.  
3   DATA AND ESTIMATION EQUATION 
Until now, the Ethnographic Atlas has been interpreted as a cross-sectional snapshot of pre-
colonial Africa, like the flat map image in Figure 1. But it is not a simple cross-section. Figure 2 
shows the distribution of observations by the date of observation. Observations span the entire 
colonial period. Only a small percentage is pre-colonial. The colonial “scramble” for Africa 
followed the Berlin Conference of 1885, but only 11 percent of the observations in the 
Ethnographic Atlas were made before 1900. The modal decade of observation was the 1920s 
when almost 25 percent of observations were made. More than 35 percent of the observations 
were made 1930 or later.  
 
We exploit this temporal heterogeneity to investigate the effects of colonial pacification. We step 
systematically towards the estimation of the following equation with the goal of better 
identifying pacification and its effects: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑘𝑘𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘 + 𝜃𝜃2𝑘𝑘𝑍𝑍𝑘𝑘 + 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 + 𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 + 𝜀𝜀𝑘𝑘                       (1) 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘  is the 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘ℎ characteristic of group i as recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 is the 
approximate date-of-observation of group i as recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 is the 7  
duration of colonial rule over group i. The coefficient on 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 (𝛽𝛽2𝑘𝑘) is the estimated effect of 
the duration of colonial occupation on the kth characteristic of the societies in the Ethnographic 
Atlas, holding calendar TIME effects constant – or the effects of pacification.  𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘 is a vector of 
geographic controls for group i that correlate with group characteristics and  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘. 𝑍𝑍𝑘𝑘 is a 
vector of controls for endogenous selection on 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘. 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 is colony and colonizer fixed effects and  
𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 is region fixed effects. 
 
3.1   The date-of-observation 
Most of the recorded dates in the Ethnographic Atlas (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘) are the first years of decades 
(1890, 1900, 1910, etc.). Murdock leaves no clues as to his method for assigning dates, but one 
can reasonable assume that he inferred the dates “to which the ethnographic Atlas pertain” from 
the vast number of publication he consulted, and that he intended the dates to be decade markers. 
We therefore interpret the date of observation in the broad sense of the decade in which the 
observation was made.7  
 
3.2   Geographic controls  
Given that our outcomes are a range of economic, social, and political characteristics of groups, 
we attempt to control for factors that might influence both date-of-observation and the 
development of group-level characteristics. Our primary motivation is to proxy for inter-group 
trade. Trade very plausibly influenced both the development of group characteristics and the ease 
of observation by ethnographers.  
  
The vector of spatial controls (𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘) comprises variables measuring the distance from the centroid 
of group i to the coastline; the distance from the centroid of group i to the nearest major river; a 
dummy variable indicating that the group is located within 50 kilometers of the coastline; 
measures of ethnic density within 50 and 100 kilometer radii of the centroid of group i8; mean 
elevation of group i; a measure of the water area in the territory of group i; an index of soil 
7 In the final analysis of the impact of colonial duration we do not investigate nor try to identify the impact of the passage of calendar time, but rather use date of observation as a control variable in an analysis of colonial duration. In that context, we interpret date of observation as a control variable that allows us to identify the effects of the duration of colonial rule on group characteristics, holding decade constant. 
8 We use all groups from the entire “Murdock Map” (1959) for our measures of ethnic density, not only the linked 
groups. Given that only about half of the land area of Africa is linked from the map to the Ethnographic Atlas, this 
helps account for spatial correlation between observed and unobserved groups. 8  
                                                        
quality for group i;  the land area, in square kilometers, of group i; and an index of malaria 
suitability in the territory of group i.9 We also control for region fixed effects (𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘) in order to 
account for potential differences in both outcomes and date of observations due to fixed, large-
scale variation such as climate. 
 
3.3   Controls for date-of-observation 
In an effort to further randomize the date-of-observation for group i (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘) we add two 
additional controls. The first is the fraction of groups contiguous to observation i that were never 
observed. This controls for unobserved factors that may have influenced whether or not a society 
was observed and placed in the Ethnographic Atlas. If a society is surrounded by unobserved 
societies then it is likely that its date-of-observation is not random but related to the reasons why 
the contiguous societies were not observed, like being inhospitable to Europeans or being fierce 
resistors of pacification. A second variable is added that is similar to the first but uses 
information on the observation dates of contiguous societies. This variable measures the average 
date of observation for the societies contiguous to group i.  
 
3.4   The date-of-colonization 
The 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘 variable is recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas but the 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 variable must be 
constructed. It is the duration of time between the date-of-colonization and the date-of-
observation. Common knowledge has it that the colonization of Africa was a rapid “scramble” -- 
that as late of the 1870s much of Africa was still unknown to outsiders -- then following the 
Berlin Conference of 1885 the continent was quickly parceled according to nearly-current 
country borders (Pakenham 1991). In reality, parts of Africa had repeat European contact and 
colonization for many years prior to 1885, while other parts of Africa remained largely 
untouched by European influence well into the 20th century (Hargreaves 1985). In this sub-
section we take great care to date the onset of colonial occupation and assign those dates to each 
society found in the Ethnographic Atlas.  
 
Creating group-level measures of the date of colonial occupation is not a trivial exercise. 
Consider Nigeria. When was it colonized by the British? There was a commercial European 
9 We use Stelios Michalopolous and Elias Papaioanno’s geo-linked Ethnographic Atlas for some of our data; we 
have replicated most of the geographic covariates. https://sites.google.com/site/steliosecon /research 9  
                                                        
presence on the Nigeria coast dating back centuries before 1885. According to the Transatlantic 
Slave Voyages Database slaves were exported from Lagos as early as 1652, and the British 
annexed and colonized Lagos, the largest city in modern Nigeria, in 1861-1862. The Oil Rivers 
Protectorate in the Niger Delta was formed in 1884, renamed the Niger Coast Protectorate in 
1893 and then merged in 1900 with territory purchased from the Royal Niger Company to form 
the Southern Nigeria Protectorate which covered roughly the southern third of modern Nigeria. 
The Northern Nigeria Protectorate was established by the Royal Niger Company in 1886 and 
then taken over by the British in 1900. In 1914 the Southern and Northern Nigeria Protectorates 
were merged to form the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. The modern boundaries of Nigeria 
were established starting in 1898 when Britain and France ended an eight-year conflict with the 
Anglo-French Agreement, which settled the western border of Nigeria. The boundaries were 
finalized in 1960 when Northern Cameroons (which was initially part of German Kamerun but 
ceded to Great Britain in 1919 by a League of Nations Mandate following World War 1) was 
incorporated into newly independent Nigeria.  
 
Should the date of colonization for Nigeria be 1862, 1884, 1900, 1914, or 1919? Perhaps in 
1906, when Lagos was incorporated into the Southern Nigeria Protectorate? Perhaps, as Ola 
Olsson (2009) argues, in 1851 when “the British replace[d] the local king in Lagos after a naval 
attack (p. 548)?” Should an area administrated by a government-chartered company count as an 
official government colony? Nigeria represents a particularly challenging case, but to some 
extent all African colonies defy exact colonial dating. Commercial influence preceded official 
colonization in almost every case and final colony borders were often not fixed until the early 
20th century.  
 
The solution to the classification problem depends on what you want the variable DUR to 
capture. Given the results of Acemoglu et al (2001) and La Porta et al (1997, 2008), it seems 
reasonable that the date of colonization should capture the beginning of systematic colonization, 
with the concurrent importing of laws, institutions, and customs from the colonizer countries. To 
that end, we seek the marginal effect of systematic colonial administration of the land, rather 
than something like an “outside contact” effect or a “commercial contact” effect. Following the 
literature, we code protectorates, annexes, and colonies as being equivalent.  
 10  
Few authors have attempted to empirically assess the effects of colonial occupation on outcomes 
in Africa, in part because of this classification problem. We offer a contribution to the literature 
by refining the date-of-colonization at the ethnic group-level. Instead of coding the entirety of a 
modern country as being colonized at a single date, we allow sub-national territories to be 
colonized at different dates depending on the colonizing activity in the region. We largely rely on 
Pakenham (1991) and Hargreaves (1985) for dates and territories. When lacking any other 
source, we follow the lead of Sacerdote and Feyrer (2005) and use Wikipedia as a first 
approximation, and then consult the underlying sources for confirmation. 
 
Take Nigeria as an example. Ethnic groups located in the Lagos colony are coded as being 
colonized in 1862, when Lagos was colonized. Ethnic groups in the Oil Rivers protectorate are 
coded as being colonized in 1884; groups in the rest of Southern Nigeria are coded as being 
colonized in 1900 and groups in the Northern Nigeria protectorate in 1900. Where groups do not 
lie completely within one colony or another we assign the group to the colony that contains the 
majority of the group’s territory. See Figure 3 for a representation.  
 
3.5   Controls for date-of-colonization 
Given the lack of systematic record-keeping in most parts of late 19th century Africa, and given 
the vast geographical scope of the continent, any coding of date-of-colonization will inevitably 
contain error. Although attenuation bias due to random measurement error would cause our 
estimates to be biased towards zero, the error in this particular case need not be random. It is 
well-known that the African hinterland took years or decades to come under effective colonial 
administration following the imposition of official colonial administration (Herbst, 2000). It is 
therefore possible that, even with our refined coding of colonization date we still overstate the 
duration of effective colonial rule over far-flung groups. Our sub-national dating of colonial 
occupation allows for within-country heterogeneity in the date of colonization, which is 
consistent with historical accounts of hinterlands remaining largely unaffected by early colonial 
presence along the coast,10 but we go a step further. We account for the actual distance between 
the seat of colonial authority and the homelands of ethnic groups. When a territory is colonized, 
10 From J.D. Hargreaves, Western Africa 1886-1905:  “There was clearly great diversity in which the new colonial 
order initially presented itself to African rulers and their subjects, and in the ways by which they tried to come to 
terms with it. But by 1905 – although there were still removed districts in the rain-forest and desert where no 
effective ‘pacification’ had yet taken place – the fact of colonial rule had generally been accepted.” 11  
                                                        
the first official act is to set up a colonial headquarters. Colonial authority then radiates outward 
from the headquarters into the surrounding hinterland. This takes time. The Oil Rivers 
Protectorate, for example, is coded as being colonized in 1884, but an ethnic group located some 
distance from the colonial headquarters of the Oil Rivers Protectorate may not have interactions 
with white chief authority until sometime later. To account for this spatial dimension of the 
broadcast of colonial authority, we include as a control variable the distance between the colonial 
headquarters of each colonized territory and the centroid of each ethnic group in that territory.  
 
Lastly, we include colony fixed effects (𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘) that control for differing selections into colonization 
and different colony-specific policies. It is well-documented that the European powers had 
different agendas for their colonial conquests in Africa – a north-south route and the deterrence 
of the slave trade for the United Kingdom; new markets for the French; political clout for the 
Germans. Even within colonizers there is evidence that colonial regimes pursued different 
policies in order to better adapt to local conditions (Frankenma and van Waijenburg 2014). To 
the extent that these agendas influenced choice of territory, which in turn may have influenced 
group societal characteristics, it is necessary to use within-colony variation for our estimates 
(Sanderson 1985). Even if the colonization of Africa approached a “scramble” where the identity 
of the colonizer was randomly assigned, differing colonial policies like the French tendency 
toward assimilation or the British policy of indirect rule means that duration effects might differ 
by colonizer. If this is the case then including colony fixed effects is a conservative estimation 
strategy but it will not bias the results.  
 
There are three possible methods for assigning colonizer to ethnicities: the initial colonizer; the 
colonizer at the time of observation; and the major colonizer during the era of colonization (the 
colonizer with the most years of colonization). The three are not equivalent because colonial 
possessions were re-assigned following World War I.11 We follow the lead of Bertocchi and 
Canova (2002) and assign the colonizer with the longest duration at the time of observation. The 
Luguru, for example, in the colony of Tanzania were observed in 1930. Tanzania began its 
colonial experience in 1890 as German East Africa (with the Anglo-German treaty of 1890) and 
11 In 1919, the League of Nations issued a mandate stripping Germany of its colonial possessions, and transferring 
their ownership to other European countries. In particular, Germany was divested of Burundi (Belgium), Cameroon 
(UK and France, mostly France), Rwanda (Belgium), Tanzania (UK), and Togo (UK and France, roughly equal 
portions), Namibia (South Africa, and, by connection, UK). 12  
                                                        
became a British Mandate in 1919. The Luguru experienced 29 years of German rule and eleven 
years of British rule before being observed in 1930. We therefore code Luguru as a Germany 
colony.12  
 
To account for possible spatial correlation in the dependent variables we follow Michalopolous 
and Papaionnou (2013) and use Camerson, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) standard errors and 
double-cluster at the country-level and the ethnic language-family level.13 
4   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The goal is to identify and estimate the impact of colonial pacification on the economic and 
political characteristics of the African societies found in the Ethnographic Atlas. We begin with 
the impact of calendar TIME and then add DUR to pick up the effects of the duration of colonial 
rule holding calendar TIME effects constant. We call these duration affects the effects of 
pacification – the effects of the duration of time that colonizers ruled, holding calendar time 
effects constant. 
 
4.1   Calendar TIME trends 
Column (1) of Table 1 reports simple OLS regressions of group characteristics (𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘) on the date 
of observation (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑘𝑘) with no controls. As time passed, the ethnographies in the Ethnographic 
Atlas tended to record less reliance on nomadic activities like hunting and animal husbandry and 
more reliance on sedentary activities like agriculture -- changes generally consistent with 
modernizing economies. “Jurisdictional hierarchy at the local level” tended to increase over time, 
but “jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local level” (what has been called “political 
centralization”) tended to decrease over time, as did “political integration.”14 There is no 
evidence in these data of any diffusion of the plough over the 130 years covered by the sample, 
but there was a clear tendency to abolish slavery15 and move towards a more-equitable 
12 In practice, the choice of colonizer in situations like this makes little difference to the magnitudes and statistical 
significance of regression coefficients. 
13 Restricting the sample to the group level by dropping all but the largest repeated country-group observations does 
not substantially change the results.  
14 Jurisdictional Hierarchy at the Local Level is defined as group organization in which there is “original and 
definitive jurisdiction over some sphere of social life in which the organization has the legitimate right to make 
decisions having a significant effect on its members (Murdock 1962).” 
15 It is worth noting that the variable v70 in the Ethnographic Atlas is mis-coded in the electronic version. The 
variable classifies group-level slavery as being either Absent, Hereditary and socially significant; Non-Hereditary 13  
                                                        
distribution of inherited property.16 We find no evidence that ascension to village headship or 
lineage systems of descent and inheritance were systematically influenced by the passage of 
calendar TIME between 1830 and 1960.  
  
Column (2) of Table 1 adds the spatial controls and the two variables that control for 
endogeniety in the TIME of observation. The R-squares improve considerably, but the only other 
substantive change is the negative coefficient on Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond the Local 
Community, which loses statistical significance. The substantive similarity of the coefficients in 
columns (1) and (2) argues for the plausible exogeniety of date-of-observation in the 
Ethnographic Atlas. 
 
Given that it is possible to interpret the coefficient in an OLS linear probability model as 
probabilities (given sufficient variation in the outcome variable) we find that the time effects on 
slavery are substantively large: an additional decade is associated with a 10.6 percentage point 
increase in the likelihood that an ethnic group would have abolished slavery, and a 8.0 
percentage point decrease in the likelihood that slavery would still exist at the time of 
observation. Relative to their sample means, these effects imply a positive 18% and negative 
21% change, respectively. Since the Ethnographic Atlas codes variables on different scales 
(some are 0-9; some 0-5; some 0-3; some 0-1) direct comparisons of coefficients are not 
especially informative. However, comparisons of standardized “beta” coefficients for outcomes 
that changed significant over time reveal that the effects of TIME on the abolition of slavery and 
the presence of slavery are approximately twice as large as the next largest association. 
Altogether, these estimates imply that groups in Africa were undergoing economic, political, and 
social change in the later 19th and early 20th centuries, with the most rapid change being the 
abolition of slavery.  
 
and incipient; and present but type not identified; but treats groups that did, and did not, abolish slavery in the same 
manner. This has the effect of making slavery seem much more prevalent, according to v70 at the time of 
observation, than it actually was. We correct this in our analysis. See appendix 2 for more details. 
16 We condition our measure of abolition of slavery on the group having at one point had slavery; that is to say, we 
exclude from this regression groups for which slavery has been historically absent.  14  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
4.2   Pacification 
Revealing though they are, these time trends do not necessarily reveal much about the effects of 
pacification. The date-of-observation (TIME) does not correlate one-for-one with the duration of 
colonial rule (DUR) because there was no uniform date-of-colonization for all groups. While it is 
true that the TIME effects in columns (1) and (2) include the effects of time spent under colonial 
rule, they also include time effects that have nothing to do with the duration of time spent under 
colonial rule -- like the globalization of trade, broad changes in colonial policy, world wars, 
climate trends, and general technological, cultural and development trajectories that were 
unaffected by the duration of colonial rule. Since our goal is to use DUR to identify and estimate 
the effects of pacification, we add DUR to the equation and retain the TIME variable as a control 
for the other covariates that changed over calendar time.17 By allowing the levels of the outcome 
variables to change over time, we are using within-decade variation in DUR to identify the effect 
of an additional year of pacification. Figure 4 shows that there is a substantial amount of within-
decade variation in DUR.18   
 
This is the complete specification of equation (1). We add the variable measuring the distance 
between the occupied group’s homeland and the colonial headquarters. We also add colony 
fixed-effects to control for systematic variations across colonies. Finally, we restrict the sample 
to groups observed after the imposition of colonial rule. We omit from the sample groups 
observed before the imposition of colonial rule and groups in Liberia and Ethiopia that were 
never officially colonized by European powers. This drops approximately 20% of our sample.  
 
The results are reported in column (3) of Table 1. We measure DUR in 10-year intervals to make 
the estimated coefficients easier to read. The estimated coefficients change dramatically. The 
shift from hunting to agriculture that was picked up by the TIME trends in columns (1) and (2) 
disappears. Apparently the shift was not correlated with pacification but was a TIME trend 
17 The variable TIME is specifications (1), (2) and (3) are nearly identical because the date of observation recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas is almost universally the first year of a decade. We control for TIME linearly rather than non-parametrically in specifications (1) and (2) for ease of descriptive exposition. Specification (3) controls for TIME non-parametrically, but the results do not change substantively if we control for TIME linearly. 18 For ease of viewing, the figures are reported without outliers. Four groups located in Equatorial Guinea and Mozambique are recorded as having more than 390 years of duration. Our main results are robust to dropping these four outliers from the sample. 15  
                                                        
largely independent of pacification, like favorable movements in global commodity prices and/or 
changes in colonial fiscal and development policies, among others.19  
 
Surprisingly, the same interpretation might apply to the abolition of slavery. Note that while the 
magnitude of the coefficient on DUR remains large and positive, it is no longer statistically 
significant at conventional levels. This is the case for both the presence of slavery and the 
abolition of slavery.  This suggests that the large TIME trends estimated in columns (1) and (2) 
were independent of the duration of white chief rule within-decade. The historical literature on 
the abolition of slavery in colonial Africa is extremely cautious about attributing too much to the 
colonial administration’s commitment to abolish slavery.20 The moral mission to abolish slavery 
was a pretext for colonial occupation, in no small part to garner support from missionaries on the 
ground and political constituencies back home, but following occupation the primary goals 
quickly shifted to social control and self-sufficiency of the colonial administration (Phillips 
(1989). The abolition of slavery was not always consistent with these objectives. Abolition could 
advance over time and space, but in the long-run it could not jeopardize the larger goals of social 
control and administrative self-sufficiency. The estimates in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1 are 
consistent with this view. Abolition proceeded over time but not because of persistent and 
consistent pressure from white chiefs. It progressed across time and space in a host of 
idiosyncratic local outcomes and policy changes that balanced the competing colonial objectives 
of social control, economic development and political support at home and in the colonies. 
  
On the other hand, the duration of time that white chiefs held paramount authority over African 
chiefs had dramatic effects on other local institutions in Africa. Pacification was associated with 
large, dramatic and systematic changes in gender relations in Africa. The longer a white chief 
ruled over an African society, the lower the observed incidence of polygyny and the greater the 
observed shift from matriliny to patriliny in descent and inheritance rules. The estimated DUR 
effect typically runs counter to the TIME counterpart and explains why they were not captured 
by the estimated coefficients on TIME in specifications (1) and (2), an early indication that 
pacification caused these changes.  
 
19 We cannot identify the sources separately. TIME lumps together all large-scale time trends and policy changes. 20 Getz (2004); Dooling (2007); Phillips (1989); Miers and Roberts (1988); Miers and Kopytoff  (1977); Miers and Klein (2006); Lovejoy and Falola (2003). 16  
                                                        
The estimated decline in polygyny finds support in the empirical literature.21 Fenske (2013a) 
examines correlates of polygyny in sub-Saharan Africa using data from Demographic and Health 
Surveys, and documents a substantial decline in polygyny across former colonies in sub-Saharan 
African since the 1970s. Moreover, he finds that an increase in exposure to Catholic missions 
during the colonial era reduces the current prevalence of polygyny. Given that a substantial 
fraction of public education in colonial Africa was provided by missionaries (Frankenma 2012, 
Gardner 2013), and considering de facto Christian prohibitions on polygyny, it is possible that a 
negative pacification-effect on the incidence of polygyny could operate through religious-based 
public education. We return to this point in section 6.  
 
The estimated shift from matriliny to patriliny has no counterpart in the empirical literature, 
except for the general view that the relative position of African women suffered under colonial 
rule.22 Given the generally held belief that descent rules evolve over long periods of time and 
function to regulate social behavior (see Murdock, Social Structure) a systematic change 
associated with colonial pacification is surprising, if not revolutionary.23 If lineage rules function 
as a kind of “rule of law’ in pre-state societies (Bates 2010) then a systematic change would be a 
fundamental indicator of how “things fall apart” in parts of Africa under colonial rule. We are 
particularly intrigued by this possibility, so in section 5.2 we investigate this relationship further. 
We test for within-group changes in descent rules by looking to see if pacification disrupted the 
close association between descent rules and their traditional kinship nomenclature. We turn to 
the question of mechanism in section 6. 
 
5.   FURTHER TESTS 
We have documented that holding decade constant and conditional on having been colonized, 
pacification tend to lower the incidence of polygyny as a marital system, and tended to 
encourage patriliny and discourage matriliny. These results are not necessarily causal. There 
exist two margins for endogeneity of DUR: the date-of-observation recorded in the Ethnographic 
Atlas and the estimated date-of-colonization. It is possible that European countries selected areas 
21 Dalton and Leung (2014).  22 See Cocuery-Vidrovitch (1994); Burrill, Roberts and Thornberry (2010).  23 Since kinship systems tend to be stable over time (Kutsoati and Morck 2012), this result is very unexpected and 
new in the economics literature: the duration of the imposition of European laws and institutions is systematically 
associated with change in a fundamental and long-standing system of dynamic group organization. 17  
                                                        
(and therefore homelands of ethnic groups) for colonization that displayed certain desirable 
characteristics (e.g. natural resources). It is also possible that anthropologists and ethnographers 
selected groups for observation that had other desirable characteristics (e.g. peacefulness that 
facilitated observation) although the similarity of results in columns (1) and (2) in Table 1 
suggests that this is unlikely to be a major concern. A hypothetical ethnic group with long DUR 
could have been colonized early and observed late because it was a resource-laden land occupied 
by a warlike people who were hostile toward outsiders. If this group had a patrilineal inheritance 
system for unrelated reasons then our regression will erroneously attribute this patriliny to longer 
pacification. We have employed a rich set of geographic controls and controls for endogeniety in 
DUR and TIME in order to minimize the likelihood of such a spurious result, but the possibility 
remains.24 
 
The ideal solution is to use a pair of instruments that are both correlated with the timing of 
colonization and the timing of observation, but unrelated to the determinants of group-level 
characteristics.25 Given the lack of consensus in the historical growth literature regarding the 
former, this presents a significant challenge. Furthermore, it stands to reason that any variable 
that affects ease of observation also reflects the ease of inter-group contact, which would 
certainly affect group characteristics. Finding appropriate instruments for colonial duration on 
the African continent seems a priori very unlikely. In this section, we present two additional 
tests that we believe provide additional evidence that the results on DUR in column (3) are 
indeed causal: (1) we use never-colonized societies as a control groups in a diff-in-diff analysis 
and (2) we use legacy kinship terms within each group’s language as a proxy for recent changes 
in descent rules. 
 
24 As a further check on our dating scheme for colonization, we used the maps in the Cambridge History of 
Africa, Vol. 6 to assign dates of colonization in particular parts of Africa. For example, upon the signing of the Makoko Treaty in 1883, Pierre de Brazza claimed the French Congo for France, which encompasses the territories currently known as Gabon, the Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic (Pakenham 1991). Consequently, and consistent with our historical sources, in the original specification we classified the Central African Republic as having been colonized between 1889 and 1903. The maps, however, tell us to re-code the entire country to 1902. Similarly, we had coded Mali as having been colonized between 1886 and1893 but the maps say 1902. We also adjust Nigeria to being colonized uniformly in 1914. We re-perform our preferred specification for the impact of colonial tenure, and find the results substantively invariant to the re-coding. Tables are available from authors upon request. 
25 Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009) quite ingeniously use prevailing wind patterns as an instrument for date of 
colonization of islands. Unfortunately, this strategy is not applicable to mainland Africa. 18  
                                                        
5.1   A quasi-natural experiment 
Implicitly considering colonial duration as a treatment variable begs the question: what is the 
control group? We rejected using a treatment-control methodology because the natural control 
group (ethnicities that were never colonized) is very small relative to the treatment group.26 
However, it is instructive to observe how patriliny, matriliny and polygyny trended over DUR in 
these never-colonized groups.  
 
We construct an artificial control group consisting of groups in the never-colonized countries of 
Liberia and Ethiopia. The treatment group consists of the countries surrounding them: the Ivory 
Coast, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan.  To construct placebo measures of DUR for the 
control group, we assumed that the never-colonized groups had the average date-of-colonization 
of their contiguous treatment groups. For Liberia, the colonization date is the average for Sierra 
Leone and Ivory Coast (1887); for Ethiopia it is the average for the Sudan, Eritrea, and Somalia 
(1897). We then calculate placebo DURs for each ethnic group in these control countries. If there 
is no true pacification effect (and outcomes were trending the same way in both groups) then we 
should see no differential effect.  
 
The results are reported in Table 2. The standard errors are large because of the crude design of 
the placebo and the small number of observations, but the signs of the coefficients all suggest 
that the trends in the control group were opposite those in the treatment group. In the never-
colonized groups, polygyny was increasing relative to the treatment group, matriliny 
was increasing relative to the treatment group (and significantly different) and patriliny was 
decreasing relative to the treatment group (with the patriliny result nearly statistically significant 
at p = .11). We interpret this as suggestive evidence that the results in column (3) of Table 1 are 
indeed causal. 
 
5.2   Lineage systems and kinship terms  
The second test uses an idea found in Murdock’s book Social Structure (1949) to test for within-
group changes in descent rules and lineages groupings. According to Murdock, descent rules sort 
members of societies into groups of related kin. Each person (called Ego) is born into a kin-
26 There are 23country- groups in Ethiopia and 12 country-groups in Liberia that comprise the never-colonized, 
relative to 684 total country-groups. 19  
                                                        
group. The kin-group consists of Ego’s nuclear family, its extensions and its generations past and 
future. For a variety of reasons (having to do with economic resources, environment, post-marital 
settlement patterns, culture and historical factors) some members of Ego’s kin-group are more 
important than others. These constitute Ego’s lineage group, determined by the community’s 
descent rule and to whom Ego has certain “contractual” obligations and rights. In communities 
with unilineal descent rules, Ego’s lineage group is related through one of Ego’s parents. In 
matrilineal descent communities it is Ego’s mother and in patrilineal descent communities it is 
Ego’s father. The descent rule determines Ego’s lineage group, which determines Ego’s social 
status, marriage prospects, obligations in child-rearing, civic obligations (labor, military and 
charity), inheritance lines and lines of authority. To political scientists like Robert Bates (2010) 
lineages enforce a kind of pre-state “rule of law” at the village level, often called customary law. 
Elders and other authorities within the lineage group met out intra-group justice. Other forms of 
negotiated justice like blood-feuds settle inter-group conflict.  
 
A long-standing idea in anthropology is that firmly established lineage groupings adopt unique 
kin naming conventions that reflects the descent rule they have chosen.27 In firmly established 
matrilineal societies the “equilibrium” naming convention is called the Crow naming system. For 
patrilineal societies it is called Omaha. The Ethnographic Atlas contains data on kinship terms 
for 55% of our colonized sample.28 
 
Kinship terms are relevant for our purposes because of the historical information they may 
contain. If a lineage system changes so does the kin-naming convention that describes it but with 
a lag. In his book Social Structure (1949) Murdock describes his theory of social change and 
how one could use kin terms to identify within-group changes in descent rules and lineage 
groupings:  
 
27 According to Murdock, “The scientific significance of kinship systems was first appreciated by Morgan (1870) in 
what is perhaps the most original and brilliant single achievement in the history of anthropology (Murdock 1949, p. 
91).” The claim to scientific status stems from the fact that the nuclear family and its incest taboo are universal 
human institution and norms. From these universal conditions flow kin-relationships across families and 
generations. A kinship terminology system emerges to reduce the kin terms (for the primary (8), secondary (33) and 
tertiary (151) kinship relations) to a manageable size. The kinship terminology system reflects the boundaries, 
opportunities and contractual arrangements of the kin-group. Every beginning anthropology student has to learn the 
basic kin-naming systems and the corresponding descent rules.    
28 The six major kin naming systems are Crow, Eskimo, Hawaiian, Iroquois, Omaha, and Sudanese 20  
                                                        
Adaptive changes in kinship terminology … are frequently not 
completed until the new rule of descent has become established, 
and sometimes not for a considerable period thereafter, so that they 
may continue for some time to reflect the previous form of social 
organization (page 221-222).” 
 
We look to see if DUR disrupted the link between descent rules and their traditional kin naming 
conventions. Since changes in kin terminology necessarily lag behind changes in the descent rule 
they describe, legacy kinship terms from a prior lineage grouping are evidence of recent change 
in the descent rule. This strategy effectively differences away the kind of time-invariant 
unobservable characteristics of groups that could have led to selective colonization by Europeans 
or selective observation by anthropologists.  
 
We perform two tests that exploit the quasi-longitudinal nature of the kinship data. To reiterate, 
long-standing matrilineal descent societies converge on the Crow naming convention and long-
standing patrilineal descent societies converge on the Omaha naming convention.29 We first test 
for the disrupting effects of DUR. We look to see if DUR increases (+) or decreases (-) the 
probability that a group observed to be patrilineal/matrilineal had a naming convention that was 
not Omaha/Crow. The results of this test are reported in columns (1) and (2) in Table 3. Column 
(1) is estimated on the sample of observed matrilineal groups and we look to see if DUR 
disrupted (+) or reinforced (-) the link with Crow nomenclature. Column (2) is run on the sample 
of observed patrilineal groups and we look to see if DUR disrupted (+) or reinforced (-) the link 
with Omaha nomenclature. The only statistically significant result is found on the descent rules 
for inheriting mobile property. Pacification disrupted matrilineal descent in property inheritance.  
 
We also test for emergence. We look to see if DUR increased (+) or decreased (-) the probability 
that groups with naming conventions that were not Omaha/Crow were nonetheless observed to 
be patrilineal/matrilineal.  The results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3. Column (3) 
is estimated on the sample of societies that did not have Crow naming conventions when 
observed, and we look to see if DUR increased (+) or decreased (-) the probability that these 
29 See http://anthro.palomar.edu/kinship/kinship_6.htm. This is confirmed in our data. The correlation coefficient between Crow kinship terms and Matriliny is .21; for Crow kinship terms and Patriliny it is -.27.  For Omaha kinship terms and Matriliny it is -.18, and for Omaha kinship terms and Patriliny it is .24.  21  
                                                        
groups would nonetheless be observed as matrilineal. Column (4) is estimated on the sample of 
societies observed to not have Omaha naming conventions, and we look to see if DUR increased 
(+) or decreased (-) the probability that these groups would nonetheless be observed to be 
patrilineal. The results show that pacification tended to discourage the emergence of matriliny in 
descent rules, in the inheritance of land and the inheritance of moveable property. It also tended 
to encourage emergence of patrilineal descent in the inheritance of land. These results confirm 
the results reported in column (3) of Table 1: pacification discouraged matriliny and encouraged 
patriliny. They also support the interpretation that pacification, measured as the number of years 
that white chiefs held paramount authority over black chiefs, caused these changes.  
 
Murdock himself argued, on the basis of a complex cross-sectional analysis of his data, that there 
existed a transitional lineage system he coined the “Guinea-type” because of its prevalence in 
West Africa: 
 
This type, which is named for its prevalence in West Africa, is 
transitional… It is devised to accommodate those tribes which 
formerly belonged to one of the stable bilateral types, Eskimo and 
Hawaiian, and which have evolved patrilineal descent rules on the 
basis of patrilocal residence without having yet undergone the 
adaptive modifications in cross-cousin terms necessary to achieve a 
more typical patrilineal structure (pp. 235-236). 
 
Murdock identified another special case as the “Sudanese-type” -- communities using distinct 
descriptive names for almost every kin relationship. These societies  
 
...occur mainly in a band across central Africa from west to east on 
both sides of the boundary between the Bantu and Sudanese 
linguistic areas. Although many tribes in the same area do not 
exhibit use of descriptive terminology, the distribution nevertheless 
suggests that some obscure historical or linguistic cause has been 
operative. The second group embraced in the Sudanese category 
consists of those patrilineal societies which have developed 22  
asymmetrical cross-cousin terminology without arriving at a more 
characteristic Omaha pattern (pp. 238-239). 
 
Murdock did not venture a guess as to what caused these recent transitions towards patrilineal 
descent. We present evidence that the transitions were caused by the duration of colonial 
pacification that these societies had recently experienced.30  
 
6   MECHANISMS 
In this section we briefly examine potential mechanisms for our two main results: that longer 
pacification led to a shift away from polygyny; and that longer pacification led to a shift away 
from matriliny and toward patriliny.  Peters (1997) argues that during the period of colonial rule 
the matrilineal institutions in Malawi came under attack because of “the promotion of a 
patriarchal nuclear family by Christian and Islamic missions” and “the assumption of a male-
headed household in government policies.” Consequently, we use our baseline specification 
(with full geographic controls, decade indicators, and colony fixed effects) to test for three 
possible mechanisms: exposure to Islam, exposure to Christian missions, and direct imposition of 
colonial policy. 
 
6.1   Islam 
If Islam in Africa tended to suppress matrilineal descent and polygyny and encourage patrilineal 
descent, and if the geographical distribution of Islam varies systematically with the duration of 
colonial rule then it is possible that the influence of Islam, rather than pacification, drives our 
main results. Indeed, there is some evidence that the current geographical incidence of Islam is 
higher along pre-Islamic trade routes and that Islam spread in sub-Saharan Africa through 
contact with Muslim traders (Michalopolous et al 2012).  
 
We test for this by geocoding a 1918 map of the geographic distribution of religions in Africa 
(Bartholomew and Brooke, 1918) and superimposing it onto the Murdock Map. We assign to 
each group-country observation a 0/1 indicator for whether the majority of its land area lies 
30 Today, we refer to the remaining matrilineal societies in Central Africa that did not make the colonial transition 
from matriliny to patriliny as the “Matrilineal Belt.” 23  
                                                        
within the area labeled “Mohammedans” on the map.31 We then re-perform our baseline 
specification, but include the “Islam” indicator and an interaction between “Islam” and DUR. 
These results are presented in Table 4, Panel a. The distribution of Islam does not explain any of 
the transition from matriliny to patriliny. Nor does it explain our result for polygyny. 
 
6.2   Missionary influence 
It is well documented that British colonies effectively contracted out their schooling 
infrastructure to Catholic and Protestant missions in exchange for the missions’ freedom to win 
over as many converts as possible (Frankema 2012; Peters 1997). If missions actively attempted 
to subvert traditional systems of matriliny and polygyny, and if exposure to missions is 
correlated with the duration of colonial rule, then it is possible that the pacification effect is 
being driven by missionary influence. To test for this, we re-perform our baseline specification, 
but now include the number of missions in group-country i, as well as the interaction between 
the number of missions and DUR.32 Because we are already controlling for land area in square 
kilometers, the coefficient on the number of missions takes on a per-km interpretation. 
 
These results are presented in Table 4, Panel B. The number of missions per sq. km does not 
affect the estimated effects of pacification on the matrilineal outcomes: estimated effects for 
matriliny in descent, matriliny in land inheritance and matriliny in property inheritance are all 
virtually identical to their baseline values, and the number of missions does not significantly 
affect these estimates. This is also true for the patrilineal outcomes, but with one exception: a 
greater effect of pacification on patriliny in land inheritance when the number of missions per 
km increases. This significant interaction, combined with the fact that there is not a significant 
pacification effect on patrilineal land inheritance, suggests that direct missionary influence is, at 
most, a second-order driver of our results. Pacification dominates the missionary effect in all 
other regressions, and only when pacification does not explain a patriliny effect (in land 
inheritance, even in the baseline regression) does missionary exposure have any explanatory 
power. 
31 Of course, the fact that the map was published in 1918 does not necessarily mean it refers to Africa in 1918. However, based on the names of colonies in the map – “Belgian Congo”, established in 1908, and “German East Africa”, which ceased to exist in 1918 - we are reasonably sure that the map is intended to depict Africa sometime between 1908 and 1918. 32 The map is taken from Roome (1924). We thank Nathan Nunn for making the digitized version available. 24  
                                                        
 We do find that direct missionary exposure explains a small part of the pacification effect on 
polygyny. The pacification effect remains, but the effect of an additional mission is significant: 
group-countries with one additional mission per sq. km have a larger (in magnitude) pacification 
effect of .049 percentage points, which is equivalent to an additional 2.7 years of pacification 
(recalling that the estimate duration effects are for decades of colonial duration). Furthermore, 
the positive and significant coefficient on the number of missions speaks to the endogeneity of 
mission placement: missions were more likely to originally locate in areas with high incidences 
of polygyny. 
 
6.3   Direct colonial control 
In order to control for territorial constraints on the broadcast of colonial authority, we controlled 
in our baseline specification for the distance between the centroid of group-country i and its 
colonial capital at the time of observation. Here we interact DUR and distance to the colonial 
capital to test whether groups located farther from the colonial capital experienced 
systematically different pacification effects. The results are in Table 4, Panel C. 
 
There is some evidence that the effects of pacification are weaker for ethnic groups located 
farther from the colonial capital. In all regressions except the one for matriliny in land 
inheritance, the interaction term indicates weaker pacification effects for groups farther away: 
positive in distance for matriliny and polygyny, and negative in distance for patriliny.  Moreover, 
the magnitudes of these effects are large. Relative to a group located at the colonial capital 
(which, for example, has a DUR effect of -.035 for the incidence of matriliny in property 
inheritance), a group that is the mean distance from the colonial capital (687 km) would have a 
DUR effect of -.0136, a reduction of about 60%. While the coefficients on the interaction terms 
are not significant at conventional levels, two are significant at the 15% level (matriliny in 
property inheritance and patriliny in property inheritance). 
 
7   CONCLUSION 
Conditional on a rich set of geographic controls, and using within-colony and within-decade 
variation in the duration of colonial rule, an additional year of colonial pacification was 25  
associated with a lower incidence of polygyny, less matriliny as a system of descent, more 
patriliny as a system of descent, less matriliny in land and property inheritance, and more 
patriliny in property inheritance. These results are largely robust to a differences-in-differences 
design using never-colonized groups as the control group. Furthermore, these results are 
validated by a unique estimation technique that uses information encoded within linguistic 
kinship terms as a proxy for past social structure. We are also able to rule out missionary 
influence as a mechanism for these results.  
In matrilineal societies women’s status is elevated because lineage rights run through women. 
Our analysis cannot identify the precise reasons why colonial pacification discouraged matriliny 
and encouraged patriliny. The most-likely channel is through the authority that colonizers held 
over their colonized subjects. White chiefs imposed their particular brand of masculine laws, 
customs and norms on the African societies they ruled (and observed). The recent evidence of 
an association between traditional plough use and a stronger masculine bias in gender roles 
(Alesina, Paolo and Nunn, 2013) is consistent with this interpretation. European nations 
traditionally used the plough in agriculture activities. African societies did not. The duration of 
the contact between European colonizers and the African subjects they ruled over is the most-
obvious channel for the transplantation of European laws, customs and cultures that favored 
men.33  
In Central Africa, the anthropologist Mary Douglas (1964) describes how the transition from 
matriliny to patriliny was set in motion by the practice of wife-pawning. In matrilineal societies, 
wife pawning converted matrilineal lineage rights (in land) into inheritable patrilineal property 
rights (in the pawned wife). Lovejoy and Falola (2003) document that most pawns in the 
colonial era were women and that pawnship rose substantially in the colonial era, although they 
caution that this might be a reflection of better recordkeeping in the colonial era (pp. 1-26).  
Policing the abolition of slavery may have also contributed to wife-pawning by inadvertently 
making wife-pawning the more acceptable way for Africans to control labor. 
33 See Coquery-Vidrovitch (1997, pp. 59-68) for a discussion of several cases of what she calls the “patrilineal offensive” in the colonial era which included the introduction of the plow and the importation of European legal traditions that favored men. Also see Alan Watson (1974) on the concept of legal transplants as an approach to studying comparative law. 26  
                                                        
Our analysis does not capture everything that colonial rule changed in Africa, only those 
changes associated with pacification and recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas. As for possible 
long-term effects, modern survey data in Malawi, where matriliny and patriliny co-exist, show 
that matriliny in rural settings may be the more-efficient descent rule when high-wage 
employment opportunities exist for men. In matrilineal systems, men have weaker inheritance 
rights and weaker rights in divorce settlements, so they are more inclined to work longer hours 
for wage income, over which they have stronger claims (Telalagic 2012, 2014). Matriliny is also 
an efficient labor-recruitment device in land-abundant economies, like those of pre-colonial 
Africa, because matrilineal land rights keep women on the land and attract men to the land 
(Wilks 1993, ch. 2; Murdock 1949, chs. 3-5).  On the other hand, matrilineal inheritance rules 
disperse the wealth that nuclear families accumulate because it grants inheritance rights to 
mothers’ sisters’ sons. Whatever its development potential, the growth-equity trade-off is very 
different from the Western European pattern of accumulation through male primogenitor. 
Whatever the development potential, it largely fell apart under colonial rule. 
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Table 1. OLS Estimates on TIME and DUR
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
TIME TIME DURATION
(without controls) R2 with controls R2  with controls R2
(years) (years) (decades)
Gathering -0.00161 0.002 0.00056 0.145 0.00031 0.513
(0.001) (0.002) (0.015)
Hunting -0.00459* 0.016 -0.00376** 0.179 -0.00733 0.351
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
Fishing 0.00314 0.004 0.00201 0.245 -0.00535 0.325
(0.003) (0.003) (0.020)
Animal Husbandry -0.01168* 0.017 -0.00564 0.438 0.02546 0.523
(0.006) (0.004) (0.018)
Agriculture 0.01420** 0.029 0.00626* 0.382 -0.01117 0.438
(0.006) (0.004) (0.023)
Intensity of Agriculture 0.00504 0.009 0.00336 0.271 -0.00007 0.391
(0.004) (0.003) (0.020)
Mean Size of Local Communities 0.00196 0.001 -0.00754 0.283 0.35784 0.638
(0.008) (0.010) (0.226)
Jurisdictional Heirarchy, Local 0.00415** 0.019 0.00379*** 0.280 -0.00542 0.345
       (0.002) (0.001) (0.006)
Jurisdictional Hierarchy, Beyond Local -0.00523* 0.013 -0.00316 0.180 0.00494 0.293
     (0.003) (0.002) (0.012)
Animals and Plow Cultivation -0.00071 0.001 0.00087 0.366 -0.00260 0.578
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Subsistence Economy 0.00568* 0.012 0.00234 0.179 -0.00207 0.362
(0.003) (0.003) (0.012)
Class Stratification -0.00426 0.004 -0.00175 0.124 0.04672 0.269
(0.003) (0.004) (0.033)
Presence of Slavery -0.00686*** 0.097 -0.00784*** 0.248 -0.00413 0.310
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
Slavery Abolished 0.00984*** 0.164 0.00990*** 0.288 0.02850 0.329
(0.001) (0.001) (0.022)
Democratic Institutions 0.00021 0.000 0.00002 0.038 0.00320 0.246
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Absolutist Institutions -0.00110 0.003 -0.00090 0.138 -0.00209 0.375
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
Liberal Institutions -0.00008 0.000 -0.00027 0.065 -0.00067 0.261
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Relative Monogamy 0.00014 0.000 0.00002 0.182 0.00141 0.416
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Relative Polygamy -0.00177 0.006 -0.00189 0.195 -0.02120*** 0.309
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Primogeniture in Land Inheritance. -0.00355*** 0.024 -0.00520*** 0.153 -0.00816 0.267
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008)
Primogeniture in Property. Inheritance. -0.00416*** 0.032 -0.00468*** 0.167 -0.01681* 0.257
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009)
Equality in Land Inher. 0.00477*** 0.048 0.00474*** 0.187 -0.00561 0.280
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
Equality in Prop. Inher. 0.00330** 0.020 0.00344*** 0.237 0.02427** 0.330
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011)
Matrilineal Descent -0.00122 0.005 -0.00044 0.105 -0.02703*** 0.399
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Patrilineal Descent 0.00091 0.002 -0.00057 0.123 0.02912*** 0.381
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Patriliny in Land Inheritance 0.00234* 0.012 0.00062 0.262 0.01480 0.453
(0.001) (0.001) (0.013)
Matriliny in Land Inheritance -0.00180 0.011 -0.00142 0.084 -0.02983*** 0.410
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Patriiliny in Property Inheritance 0.00035 0.000 -0.00094 0.220 0.03045*** 0.462
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
Matriliny in Property Inheritance -0.00098 0.003 -0.00034 0.141 -0.02519*** 0.468
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Political Integratin -0.01863*** 0.066 -0.01731*** 0.301 0.03052 0.608
(0.007) (0.006) (0.105)
(1) (2) (3)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
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Notes: Regression (1) uses as independent variable Murdock’s “Date of Observation” with no other 
controls. Regression (2) uses as independent variable Murdock’s “Date of Observation”, with geographic 
controls (listed below), region indicators, and Ethnographic Atlas selection controls (listed below). 
Regression (3) uses as independent variable “Colonial Tenure”, defined as date of observation minus date 
of colonization, and restricts the sample to groups that were in countries that were colonized, and which 
also have non-negative colonial tenure. It uses as controls decadal indicators, Ethnographic Atlas 
selection variables (listed below), geographic controls (listed below), colony fixed effects, and distance 
from group centroid to colonial headquarters for colonizing country.  
Geographic controls comprise a dummy if the group-country is coastal; the number of other ethnicities 
within 50 and 100 kilometers of the centroid of each group-country; the land area in square kilometers; 
the distance in km to the closest major river; the distance in km to the nearest point on the coast; a malaria 
stability index; average land quality for cultivation; mean elevation of each group-country; and a measure 
of water area. Ethnographic Atlas selection controls are “Fraction of contiguous groups not in EA”, which 
measures the fraction of groups that are contiguous to group i in the Murdock Map (1959), but which are 
not included in the Ethnographic Atlas, and “Average Date of Observation of Contiguous Groups” which 
measures the average date of observation, in the EA, of all groups contiguous to group i. 
Standard errors are adjusted for two-way clustering at the country and ethno-linguistic family level. 
Standard errors are included in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<.01.   
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 Table 2. Diff-in-Diff Analysis 
 
 
Notes: this sample is restricted to groups in the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Eritrea, Somolia, and the Sudan. All groups in Liberia are assigned a 
“placebo” colonization date of 1887, which is the average of the colonization dates for contiguous neighboring countries Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast. All groups in 
Ethiopia are assigned a placebo colonization date of 1897, which is the average date of colonization for contiguous neighboring countries Sudan, Eritrea, and 
Somolia. Tenure is then calculated as the different between date of observation and date of colonization (placebo and real).  The sample is restricted to those groups 
with non-negative tenures. All specifications incorporate “major” colonizer fixed effects, region fixed effects, fraction of contiguous neighboring groups included in 
the EA, average date of observation for neighboring groups, and geographic controls. Geographic controls include a dummy if the group-country is coastal; the 
number of other ethnicities within 50 and 100 kilometers of the centroid of each group-country; the land area in square kilometers; the distance in km to the closest 
major river; the distance in km to the nearest point on the coast; a malaria stability index; average land quality for cultivation; mean elevation of each group-country; 
and a measure of water area.  “Fraction of contiguous groups not in EA” measures the fraction of groups that are contiguous to group i in the Murdock Map (1959), 
but which are not included in the Ethnographic Atlas. “Average Date of Observation of Contiguous Groups” measures the average date of observation, in the EA, of 
all groups contiguous to group i. Standard errors are adjusted for two-way clustering at the country and ethno-linguistic family level. Standard errors are included in 
parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<.01.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Matrilineal Patrilineal Patriliny in Land Matriliny in Land Patriliny in Property Matriliny in Property
VARIABLES Polygyny Descent Descent Inheritance Inheritance Inheritance Inheritance
Duration (years) -0.00334 -0.00423 0.00466 0.00398** -0.00318 0.00408 -0.00449
(0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Duration * Never Colonized 0.00244 0.00562** -0.00999 -0.00303 0.00402 -0.00200 0.00381
(0.011) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 92 92 92 70 70 74 74
R-squared 0.329 0.490 0.466 0.529 0.592 0.582 0.614
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Table 3. Descent and Kinship Terms Analysis 
 
Notes: the sample is initially restricted to the ethnic groups with non-negative tenure, and all 
specifications incorporate colony fixed effects, distance to the nearest colonial capital at date of 
observation, fraction of contiguous neighboring groups included in the EA, average date of observation 
for neighboring groups, and geographic controls (listed below). 
 
Column (1) restricts the sample to “currently” matrilineal groups. Dependent variable is a 0/1 indicator 
for use of non-Crow kinship terms.  
Column (2) restricts the sample to “currently” patrilineal groups. Dependent variable is a 0/1 indicator for 
use of non-Omaha kinship terms.  
Column (3) restricts the sample to groups with non-Crow kinship terms. Dependent variable is a 0/1 
indicator for group being currently matrilineal. 
Column (4) restricts the sample to groups with non-Omaha kinship terms. Dependent variable is a 0/1 
indicator for group being currently patrilineal. 
 
Geographic controls comprise a dummy if the group-country is coastal; the number of other ethnicities 
within 50 and 100 kilometers of the centroid of each group-country; the land area in square kilometers; 
the distance in km to the closest major river; the distance in km to the nearest point on the coast; a malaria 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Not Crow Not Omaha Matrilineal Patrilineal
Colonial Tenure (in 10s of years) -0.02846 -0.00656 -0.02478*** 0.02141
(0.027) (0.013) (0.004) (0.021)
Observations 60 199 290 264
R-squared 0.874 0.343 0.559 0.461
Colonial Tenure (in 10s of years) . -0.01052 -0.02196*** 0.06612**
. (0.028) (0.006) (0.029)
Observations 38 158 223 209
R-squared . 0.290 0.601 0.565
Colonial Tenure (in 10s of years) 0.03971* -0.00079 -0.02805*** 0.02384
(0.024) (0.015) (0.007) (0.025)
Observations 65 166 251 234
R-squared 0.804 0.308 0.676 0.510
SAMPLE Matrilineals Patrilineals Not Crow Not Omaha
IN LAND INHERITANCE
IN PROPERTY INHERITANCE
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
IN DESCENT
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stability index; average land quality for cultivation; mean elevation of each group-country; and a measure 
of water area. “Fraction of contiguous groups not in EA” measures the fraction of groups that are 
contiguous to group i in the Murdock Map (1959), but which are not included in the Ethnographic Atlas. 
“Average Date of Observation of Contiguous Groups” measures the average date of observation, in the 
EA, of all groups contiguous to group i. “Distance to Colonial Capital at Date of Observation” measures 
the distance in kilometers to the nearest capital of the colonizer of group i. Standard errors are adjusted 
for two-way clustering at the country and ethno-linguistic family level. Standard errors are included in 
parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<.01. 
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Table 4: Possible Mechanisms for Main Results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Matrilineal 
Descent 
Matri. in 
Land Inher 
Matri. in 
Prop. Inher 
Patrilineal 
Descent 
Patri. in 
Land Inher 
Patri. in 
Prop. Inher 
Relative 
Polygamy 
Panel A: Islamic Influence 
Colonial Duration (in 10s of 
years) -0.0269*** -0.0293*** -0.0256*** 0.0291*** 0.0147 0.0314*** -0.0214*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) 
Islamic in 1918? 0.05774 -0.04944 -0.03226 -0.13053 -0.06870 -0.05841 -0.06632 
 (0.106) (0.122) (0.135) (0.101) (0.149) (0.149) (0.119) 
Islamic * Duration -0.01388 -0.00098 0.01757 0.02053 0.01404 -0.01638 0.02404 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.035) (0.034) 
Observations 531 416 450 531 416 450 535 
Panel B: Missionary Influence 
Colonial Duration (in 10s of 
years) -0.0267*** -0.0291*** -0.0244*** 0.0292*** 0.01200 0.0305*** -0.01825*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007) 
# of Missions in 1924 0.00171 0.00270 0.00332 0.00048 -0.01032 -0.00257 0.01639** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Missions * Duration -0.00011 -0.00065 -0.00034 -0.00064 0.00264* -0.00136 -0.00488*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 531 416 450 531 416 450 535 
Panel C: Distance to Colonial Capital 
Colonial Duration (in 10s of 
years) -0.0351*** -0.0298*** -0.0357*** 0.0330*** 0.01727 0.0440*** -0.03237*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) 
Distance to Colonial Capital -0.05604 0.02194 -0.06757 0.06112 -0.00418 0.19605 -0.14107 
 (0.117) (0.120) (0.129) (0.135) (0.130) (0.171) (0.104) 
Distance to Col. Cap. * Duration 0.02294 -0.00016 0.03216 -0.01109 -0.00744 -0.04129 0.03147 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) 
Observations 531 416 450 531 416 450 535 
Notes: Panel A tests for difference in duration effect by Islamic status; Panel B tests for differences in duration effect by missionary exposure; and Panel C tests 
for differences in duration effect by distance from colonial capital. All regressions include geographic, Ethnographic Atlas, and colonial controls. Geographic 
controls comprise a dummy if the group-country is coastal; the number of other ethnicities within 50 and 100 kilometers of the centroid of each group-country; 36  
the land area in square kilometers; the distance in km to the closest major river; the distance in km to the nearest point on the coast; a malaria stability index; 
average land quality for cultivation; mean elevation of each group-country; and a measure of water area. Ethnographic Atlas selection controls are “Fraction of 
contiguous groups not in EA”, which measures the fraction of groups that are contiguous to group i in the Murdock Map (1959), but which are not included in 
the Ethnographic Atlas, and “Average Date of Observation of Contiguous Groups” which measures the average date of observation, in the EA, of all groups 
contiguous to group i. Colonial controls comprise the distance from the centroid of group-country i to the colonial capital of its colonizing country in thousands 
of km and country fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for two-way clustering at the country and ethno-linguistic family level. Standard errors are 
included in parentheses. * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.  
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 Figure 2. Frequency of date of observation 
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 Figure 3 – Colonization Dates of Ethnic Groups in Nigeria 
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Figure 4. The Duration of occupation by decade 
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Appendix 1 
Summary Statistics for variables 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Range N 
Reliance on Gathering .3829161 .8470335 0-9 679 
     
Reliance on Hunting .8276878 .7669803 0-9 679 
     
Reliance on Fishing .8306333 1.058414 0-9 679 
     
Reliance on Animal 
Husbandry 
2.409426 1.900233 0-9 679 
     
Reliance on Agriculture 5.543446 1.795795 0-9 679 
     
Intensity of Agriculture 3.606195 1.14905 1-6 678 
     
Mean Size of Local 
Communities 
4.019608 1.949058 1-8 255 
     
Jurisdictional Hierarchy 
of Local Community 
1.920354 .6427635 1-3 678 
     
Jurisdictional Hierarchy 
Beyond Local 
Community 
2.221239 .9698666 1-5 678 
     
Animals and Plow 
Cultivation 
1.119469 .4633113 1-3 678 
     
Subsistence Economy 6.02651 1.135069 1-9 679 
     
Class Stratification 2.397188 1.41436 1-5 569 
     
Abolition of Slavery .5730994 .4951104 0-1 513 
     
Slavery Present .360 .4805 0-1 608 42  
     
Relative Democracy .09 .2864684 0-1 500 
     
Relative Absolutism .698 .4595851 0-1 500 
     
Relative liberality .024 .1532023 0-1 500 
     
Monogamy .0356083 .1854491 0-1 674 
     
Polygamy .5014837 .5003691 0-1 674 
     
Primogeniture in Land 
Inheritance 
.5424063 .4986905 0-1 507 
     
Primogeniture in 
Property Inheritance 
.4771127 .4999162 0-1 568 
     
Equality in Land 
Inheritance 
.3530572 .4783923 0-1 507 
     
Equality in Property 
Inheritance 
.4383803 .4966258 0-1 568 
     
Matrilineal Descent .1646707 .371161 0-1 668 
     
Patrilineal Descent .7095808 .454296 0-1 668 
     
Relative Patriliny in Land 
Inheritance 
.6793169 .4671826 0-1 527 
     
Relative Matriliny in 
Land Inheritance 
.1650854 .3716103 0-1 527 
     
Relative Patriliny in 
Property Inheritance 
.6390845 .4806894 0-1 568 
     43  
Relative Matriliny in 
Property Inheritance 
.1971831 .3982224 0-1 568 
     
Political Integration 3.87156 1.639224 1-8 109 
     
Date of Observation 1917.239 21.448 1830-
1960 
679 
     
Colonial Tenure 24.3618 23.00276 -54-122 644 
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Appendix 2: Variable Construction and Data Sources 
 
Presence of slavery equals one if Murdock’s v70 (“Type of Slavery”) equals “incipient or 
nonhereditary”, “reported but type not identified”, or “hereditary and socially significant”, and 
Murdock’s v71 does not equal “Formerly Present but not currently existing”, zero otherwise. 
 
Abolition of slavery equals Murdock’s v71 (“Former Presence of Slavery”), conditional on 
Murdock’s v70 not equaling “absence or near absence.”. The Ethnographic Atlas codes the 
variable “Former Presence of Slavery”, as zero indicating either the historical absence or both 
current and historical existence and one indicating that there was slavery in the past, but no 
longer. That is, this captures the extent of “abolition” in its most logical form: one if there was 
some change in status of slavery as an institution within that group, and zero if not. Logically 
consistent though this is, this is not “abolition” in the usual sense of the word, i.e., a change from 
a society formerly with the institution of slavery, to without slavery at the time of observation. 
We transform this variable into “abolition” in the latter sense of the word by removing those 
groups from the sample for whom slavery has never existed; therefore, any change in slave status 
will be relative to those groups that had, and still have at the time of observation, slaves. 
 
Monogamy equal one if Murdock’s v8 (“Domestic Organization”) equals “Independent Nuclear 
Family, Monogamous”, zero otherwise 
 
Polygamy equals one if Murdock’s v8 (“Domestic Organization”) equals “independent nuclear 
family, occasional polygyny”, “Polygynous: Unusual co-wives pattern”, “Polygynous: Usual co-
wives pattern”, zero otherwise 
 
Democracy equals one if Murdock’s v72 (“Succssion to the Office of Local Headman”) equals 
“election or other formal consensus, nonhereditary”, zero otherwise 
 
Absolutist equals one if Murdock’s v72 (“Succession to the Office of Local Headman”) equals 
“Matrilineal heir” or “Patrilineal heir”, zero otherwise 
 
Liberal equals one if Murdock’s v72 (“Succession to the Office of Local Headman”) equals 
“influence, wealth or social status, nonhereditary”, zero otherwise 45  
 Equality in inheritance distribution of land equals one if Murdock’s v75 (“Inheritance 
distribution for real property [land]”) equals “Equal or relatively equal”, zero otherwise 
 
Primogeniture in inheritance distribution of land equals one if Murdock’s v75 (“Inheritance 
distribution for real property [land]”) equals “Primogeniture (to the senior individual)”, zero 
otherwise; 
 
Equality and primogeniture of movable property defined in the same was as for land, but using 
Murdock’s v77 (“Inheritance distribution for movable property [land]”). 
 
Matriliny in Property Inheritance equals one if Murdock’s v76 (“Inheritance rule for movable 
property”) equals “Matrilineal” or “Other matrilinear heirs”, zero otherwise 
 
Matriliny equals one if Murdock’s v43 (Descent: Major Type) equals “Matrilineal”, zero 
otherwise 
 
Patriliny in Property Inheritance equals one if Murdock’s v76 (“Inheritance rule for movable 
property”) equals “Patrilineal” or “Other patrilinear heirs”, zero otherwise 
 
Patriliny equals one if Murdock’s v43 (Descent: Major Type) equals “Patrilineal”, zero 
otherwise 
 
Matriliny and patriliny in land inheritance defined the same as for property, but using 
Murdock’s v74 (“Inheritance rule for real property [land]”). 
 
Patrilineal Kinship equals one if Murdock’s v27 (“Kin Terms for Cousins”) equals “Omaha”, 
zero otherwise 
 
Matrilineal Kinship equals one if Murdock’s v27 (“Kin Terms for Cousins”) equals “Crow”, 
zero otherwise 
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Distance from the coast, distance from the nearest major river, coastal indicator, and ethnic 
density measures created using Nunn’s (2011) ArcGIS shapefile of the Murdock Map, and ESRI 
shapefiles for countries and river systems in Africa. 
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